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I. INTRODUCTION
As international trade increases, domestic demands and regional
trade disputes can strain relations among nations and produce intractable
situations in which economics and politics conspire to impair long-term
solutions. Such is the case in the decades-long dispute between Canada
and the United States over trade in softwood lumber,' the building blocks
of the United States housing industry! The United States lumber indus-
try is facing plummeting demand! New housing starts are expected to
reach fewer than half of the starts in 2005, the lowest amount since
World War II.
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taneously, lumber delivery costs are rising with the price of oil,' which
t J.D. Candidate, Seattle University School of Law. 2009; B.A., English and philosophy, Tufts Uni-
versity. 2001. The author would like to thank her editors: Danielle Cross, David Keenan, Josh
Large. Joanne Montague, Jennifer Smith, Matt Sullivan. Pete Talevich, and (especially) Donald and
Jacque Lysons. This article is dedicated to the author's beloved grdndmothers. Dixie Lysons and
Muriel Hambly.
I. Softwood is wood from a coniferous tree, which includes fir, spruce, pine. hemlock, and
cedar. See Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States—Supplement I .  § IX. 4407.10.01.
4409.10.10..40_90 (2008). 19 U.S.C. * 1202, available at http://hotdocs.usite.govidocsitataihts/by
chapter/0810C44.pdf.
2. The largest volume market for softwood lumber in North America is structural framing.
Lloyd C. Idand, Economic Structure and the US-Canadian Softwood Lumber Trade—Ant Connec-
lions to Trade Conflicts?, in JAMES B. HENRY CENTER, MICHIGAN STATE UNIV., U.S.-CANADA
FOREST PRODUCTS: A  BILATERAL TECHNICAL, SYMPOSIUM 95.  9 9  (2005), available at
httpWwww.maes.rnsu.eduipublicationsiresearchreports/SR/SR125.pdf.
3. Press Release, Western Wood Products Ass'n. Historical Housing Downturn to Continue in
2008, Impacting Lumber Demand. Western Mills (Mar. 26. 2008) (on tile with author).
4. Id
5. WASH. STATE DEP'T OF NATURAL RES., ECON. & REVENUE FORECAST. FISCAL YEAR 2008,
FIRST QUARTER 13 (2007), available at  http://www,dnr.wa.gov/Publicationsiobe_econ_rprts_rev
407
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reached record highs in 2008. Although low lending rates and a weak
dollar mitigate against the complete demise of the United States lumber
industry, its short-term outlook is grim: The outlook for Canada's lum-
ber industry is not much better. Canadian lumber mills are also operat-
ing under capacity. 8 Low lumber prices, thus, are taxing the lumber in-
dustry on both sides of the border, and prices continue to droll'
) M e a n -while, anti-free trade rhetoric grows in depressed local economies as
American and Canadian jobs are outsourced, making a failing lumber
industry and a backlash against free trade inevitable.
Against this backdrop, the United States faces a lumber war against
Canada. For the tast quarter of a century, the United States has accused
Canada of dumping'
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place at the expense of American lumber producers. Neither country,
however, can claim the high ground when government involvement in
Canada gives rise to allegations of unfair subsidies and when powerful
lobbying in the United States subverts the nation's professed allegiance
to free trade. Moreover, the dispute resolution mechanisms that were
supposed to settle the dispute have only exacerbated the tension between
the two countries.
The latest attempt to settle the dispute are proving, as contentiot4s as
previous attempts. On September 12. 2006, the United States and Can-
ada signed the Softwood Lumber Agreement ("SLA 2006”).
11 U n d e r  i t sterms, the two countries would end litigation over softwood lumber and
sepW7.pdfihercmafterWASU. FOR VCAS 201,g1,
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states an Ca ,la signed th  Softwood Lumber Agreement on September 12, 2tX,/6. Softwood
Lumtvr Aucemor t. U.S.-Can.. Sept. 12.  2006, as amended Oct. 12,  N M .  available
http://www,dfmacci.ge.eattradeicich/sofinood/SLA-rnain-en.aso thereinafter SLA 20061. A t  the
time, the price of nil W;15 less than $66 a barrel and fAing. Steven Malson, OPEC Legres Oil Out-
put 0; ,4 i n  Place as Price 1,77,!
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allow free trade when market conditions were favorable.
I2 T h e  a g r e e -ment seemed promising: as U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwab
announced, "[the United States has] closed this long-running dispute that
has for too long created friction with our largest trading partner."
3Within a year of the agreement, however, the United States had initiated
arbitration proceedings in the London Court of International Arbitration
("LON)" to "compel Canada to live up to its trade obligations!"
5 T w omonths before the arbitration panel issued its decision settling the dis-
pute," the United States filed a second request for arbitration.
I7 As this current dispute and years of conflict demonstrate, the soft-
wood lumber dispute is too political to be resolved by any legal regime.
Although the efficiency, the technical expertise, and the apolitical nature
of the LOA make it the best mechanism so far in settling trade agree-
ment battles, the political and economic pressures inherent in this inter-
minable lumber war mean that future battles are inevitable.
This Comment argues that the LOA will be able to resolve disputes
involving softwood lumber but not resolve the softwood lumber dispute.
Part II reviews the history of the dispute. Part III discusses the lessons
that Canada and the United States have learned about resolving trade
disputes, several of which are reflected in the current agreement. Part IV
examines why, although the current agreement provides a degree of neu-
12. Id  During unfavorable times, Canadian provinces may either impose a five to fifteen
percent export tax or impose a lower tax and limit export volumes. Id,
13. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., U.S. Trade Representative Susan C. Schwab
Announces Entry into Force of U.S.-Canada Softwood Lumber Agreement (Oct. 12, 2006), avail-
able at Intp://www.ustr.goviDocument_Library/Press_Releases/2006/0clober/US_Trade_Represcnt-
ative_SusanS_Schwab_Annotmces_Entry_into_Force_of US-Canada_Softwood_Lumber_Agree-
nwnthtml.
14. The LC1A is an established nongovernmental institution that has traditionally settled pri-
vate commercial disputes. John R. Crook, United States and Canada Arbitrate a Softwood Lumber
Dispute in the London Court of International Arbitration, 102 AM.). 1NT'L L. 192,192 (2008).
15. Press Release. Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., United States to Request Arbitration Chal-
lenging Canada's Implementation of the 2006 Softwood Lumber Agreement (Aug. 7, 2007), avail-
able at http://www.ustr.goviDocument_Library/Press_Releases/2007/AugustArnited_States jo_Req-
uest_Arbitration_ChallengingSanadas_Implementation_of the_2006_Softwood_Lumber_Agreem-
ent.html. The United States alleged that Canada had improperly implemented certain export meas-
ures required by the agreement Id
16. In March 2008. the panel concluded that Canada had violated the SLA in its eastern prov-
inces, but not in its western provinces. See Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., USTR
Disappointed with Tribunal's Mixed Decision on Softwood Lumber (Mar. 4, 2008), available at
http://www.ustr.goviassets/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2008/Marchiasset_upload_file97_145
50.pdf.
17. Request for Arbitration. Softwood Lumber Dispute (U.S. v. Can.) (Lon. Ct. Intl Arb. Jan.
2008), available at litipg/www.ustr.goviassets/Trade_Agreements/Monitoring_Enforcement/2006_
Softwood_Lumber Agrzwilleid/Arbitration_on_Provincial_Subsidiesiasset_upload Jile409_14419.
pdf. This request challenged subsidy programs in Quebec and Ontario that benefited the Canadian
softwood lumber industry. Id
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trality and finality to the dispute that prior regimes lacked, inherent po-
litical pressures will prove too large for even this agreement. Finally ,
Part V concludes that the dispute might only be resolved with an eco-
nomic compromise.
IL THE SOFTWOOD LUMBER DISPUTE
This Part describes the tumultuous history of the softwood lumber
dispute. Section A discusses factors that have aggravated the dispute.
Sections B through D describe the battles of the dispute known as Lum-
ber I, Lumber II, Lumber III, and Lumber IV and the agreements that
partitioned them. Finally , Section E summarizes the 2006 Softwood
Lumber Agreement.
A. Aggravating Factors qt
. t h e  
D i s p u t e
Because the United States lumber industry can only satisfy 50%
18of the housing industry's demand for building materia1,
19 i t  i m p o r t s  alarge percentage f its lumber from Canada.
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cess exporting to countries other than the United States.
22 A l t h o u g h  t h i sexch nge eems mutually beneficial, two factors
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(2) international oversight of the domestic laws that govern the trade re-
lationship.
I. Different Systems of Forest Management
First, and perhaps most significantly, the United States and Canada
have different ways of managing their lumber resources. I n  the United
States, private companies own most of  the forests and sell short-term
18. Michael Han & Bill Dymond, The Cul-de-Sac ofSoliwood Limber, 26 Poi:). OrtioNs 19,
19 (2005), available al httpfiwww,irpp.orgip41iarchive/nov05/hart.pdf,
19. According to the Department of Agriculture, new housing construction accounts lOr over a
third of the United States's annual consumption of softwood sawn wood products and for substantial
volumes of other softwood products. 2004-2008 USDA U.S. FOREST PRODUCTS ANN, MARKET
REV.& PROSPECTS I. available at http://www,fpl.fs.fed.usidoeumnts/Iplmilpl_m305.pdf,
20. Id.
21. Hart & Dymond.. supra note 18, at 19. Canada exports over 70*/u of its lumber. Id,
22, Id, Europe. Japan, and China do not have the demand that the United States does for mate-
rials to build wood-frame housing. I d
23. There are other factors beyond the scope of this Comment. For  example, one issue centers
on whether Canadian softwood lumber and United States softwood lumber are substitutable in the
marketplace. See generally Raw V. Nagubadi, Daowei Zhang, Jeffrey P. Prestemon & David N.
Wear. Softwood  Lwnher Products in the United Stows: Substitutes, Complonents, or Unrelated?, 50
FOREST SCI. 416 (2004).
24. Hart & Dymond. supra note 18, at 19.
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cutting rights to their timber in arm's-length transactions, either through
auctions or through private contracts. 25 Market demand, thus, determines
the price of the timber and directly affects the cost of turning the timber
into lumber.
26 In contrast, most of the forests in Canada are located on Crown
(public) lands, which the provincial governments control?' Provincial
control ensures an adequate timber supply to the local mills and stabi-
lizes employment within the mill towns?' Each province has its own
system of forest management and uses a different method to calculate the
amount that harvesters must pay for the right to cut timber.
29 T h i s  s y s -tem of timber pricing is difficult to change because harvesting rights are
often embedded in long-term arrangements or licenses between harvest-
ers and the provinces."
The fundamental differences between the two systems result in
what critics in the United States call an unfair subsidy for Canadian lum-
ber producers (i.e., cheap timber) and what defenders in Canada call a
"competitive advantage."
31 F o r  t h e  
U n i t e d  
S t a t e s
,  
t h e  
i s s u
e  
o f  
s u b
s i d
y  
i
s
clear: when prices fall, United States lumber producers must reduce pro-
duction to remain competitive, whereas the more insulated Canadian
lumber producers are able to sell their lumber at low prices for a longer
period, minimizing the need to cut production?
2 C a n a d a ,  
h o w e v e r ,  
a r -
gues that the situ tion is more complicated: many United States markets
25. Gary C. Hufbauer & Yee Wong, Security and the Economy in the North American Context:
The Road Ahead for NAFTA, 29 CAN.-U.S. Li .  53, 65 (2003); accord Henry Spelter, I f  Americo
Had Canada's Stumpage System, 52 FOREST Sci. 443, 443 (2006).
26. Hart & Dymond, supra note 18, at 20. For  the purposes of this Comment, lumber is de-
fined as timber sawn into rough planks. In a market economy, the price of timber accounts for 60%
to 70% of the cost of lumber, John A. Ragosta. Trade and Agriculture, and Lumber. Why Agricul-
ture and Lumber Matter, 14 KAN. J.L. & Pun, POL'Y 413, 424 (2005). Haul ing and cutting the
timber account for the rest of the price. Id.
27. Compare R I  Anderson & Robert D. Cairns, The Softwood Lumber Agreement and Re-
source Politics, 14 CAN. PUB. POLY 186, 187 (1988), available at http://economies.cafcgi/jab?
joumal=epp&view—v14n2/CPPv14n2p186.pdf (70% of merchantable lumber on Crown lands). with
RUSS W•GORTE et JEANNE GRIMMER, CONG. RESEARCII SERV., LUMBER IMPORTS FROM CANADA:
ISSUES AND EVENTS 3 (2001), available at http://canada,usembassy.govicontentican_usa/pdfs/ lum-
ber_crs_052101.pdf (provinces own 9(r/0 of Canadian timberlands).
28. Hufbauer & Wong, supra note 25. at 65.
29, Hart & Dymond, supra note 18, at 19. F or  example, in British Columbia, fees to cut a
particular timber stand are calculated relative to the average value of other stands in the region from
the preceding period. See R. Quentin Grafton. Robert W, Lynch 84 Harry Vv'. Nelson. British Co-
lumbia's Stumpage System: Economic and Trade Polity Implications, 24 CAN. Putt. POLY S41.
544--545 (1998).
30. This is particularly true in British Columbia, See Hart & Dymond, supra note 18, at 19-20.
31. Spelter. supra note 25, at 443 (quoting forestry consultant Russell Taylor: "Canada has a
competitive advantage in the way it prices timber, but i ts not a subsidy").
32.1d at 444.
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prefer Canadian lumber,
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ficient; and trees in the United States are less accessible,'
5 Given, however, the tumultuous history of the dispute, these seman-
tics—whether the "competitive advantage" amounts to a subsidy—are
largely irrelevant. As  long as the lumber industries in both Canada and
the United States perceive each other as anti-competitive and continue to
lobby their governments to protect their domestic interests, the dispute
will not end, despite the availability of recourse to international dispute
settlement forums.
2. International Oversight of Domestic Laws
Another aggravating factor that hinders the dispute's resolution is
international oversight of  domestic trade laws. Both Canada and the
United States have countervailing duty
36 a n d  
a n t i d u m p i n g
3 7  l a w s  
t o  
l i m i t
foreign competition with domestic industries.
38 C o u n t r i e s  
i m p l e m e n t i n g
these laws maintain that the laws' purpose is to ensure fair trade, while
countries exporting goods maintain that the laws' purpose is to protect
domestic industries by discouraging cheap imports.
39 In the United States, countervailing duty and antidumping cases be-
gin when a domestic industry files a compliant alleging that a foreign
government is subsidizing or dumping an export in the United States
market to the detriment of a domestic industty..
w T h e  D e p a r t m e n t  
o f33. See Anderson & Cairns. supra note 2
7
. a t  1 8 6 .
34. See. e.g., Qing Xiang & Runsheng Yim, Impact of  Glabalizathnt and Polley Change on
United Stales Solwoad Lumber Trade, 52 Ft iat,s r Nut, 3141,381 (NOM (giving the example of pro-
tection of the spotted owls halting national timber sales in the 1980s in the Pacific Northwest).
35. The adverse economic consequences of the softwood lumber dispute might have made the
Canadian industry more efficient. Itutbauer & Wong, supra note 25, at 65 n.44.
36. A countervailing duly is a duty toted on an imported good to offset subsidies to producers
or exporters of that good in the exporting country. OtTicF or  INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. INT'L TRADE
COMM'N. ANTIDUMPING &  COUNTERVAILING DLTY HANDROOK A- 3 (20(17), available a t
hup://www.usitc.gov/trade remedy/73 Lad 701 cvd/documentsihandbook.pdf
37. Dumping occurs when a product is sold in an importing country at a price that is lower than
the price at which it is sold in the exporting country. Id. at A-4.
38. See discussion infra Parts II.B & 11,1). I n  the United Stales, to impose a countervailing
duty or tariff, the complaining industry must establish three things: (I) the imported goods are being
subsidized (subsidization); (2) the subsidized goods are either materially injuring the industry or
threatening to materially injure the industry (injury); and (3) there is a causal link between the sub-
sidy and the injury (causation). 19 U.S,C, § 1671 (2007). T o prove dumping, a complaining indus-
try must similarly prove three things: ( I ) the goods are being dumped t (2) the dumping is causing a
material injury or threat of a material injury: and (3) there is a causal link between the dumping and
the injury. 19 U.S.C.* 1673 (20071.
39. See Asinsti  K.  VAIDYA, 61,013A IZATION: ENCYCLOPEDIA or  TRADE, LAHOR, AND
POLITICS 3 (2005).
40. Bruce A. Blonigen, Tht
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Commerce ("Commerce")
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ing investigations and determines whether the import is, in fact, being
subsidized and dumped into the market.
42 S i m u l t a n e o u s l y ,  
t h e  
I n t e r n a -
tional Trade Commission ( "ITC" o r  "Commission")
43 i n v e s t i g a t e swhether the subsidized import is causing an injury, or is threatening to
cause an injury, to a domestic industry." I f  an import is subsidized, and
if  that subsidization is injuring a domestic market, then the authorities
will impose duties
45 t o  
c o r r e c t  
t h e  
m a r k
e t  
d i s t o
r t i o n
. "
Because countervailing duty and antidumping laws affect interna-
tional trad , bilateral and multilateral trade treaties regulate their applica-
tion. In  April 1994, after eight years of negotiations to reform the rules
governing international trade,
47 t h e  
m i n i s t e r s  
o f  
1 1 7   
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s i g n
e d  
t h
e
agreement that created the World Trade Organization ("WTO").
48 T h eWTO is an int rnational organization that seeks to expand international
trade of goods and services. Its  most important function is to implement
and adjudicate the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT").
49The G Ar r  contains provisions to ensure the promotion of free trade,
including prohibitions on trade preferences for selected countriee and
in', 19 WORLD BANK Ecom REV, 407,410 (2005).
41. Specifically, the International Trade Administration, an agency within the Department of
Commerce, safeguards American industries from unfair competition from dumped or subsidized
imports. See generally Intl  Trade Admin., Overview: About the 1TA, http://wwwita.doe.goviover
viewItml (last visited Nov. 2, 2008).
42. See JOHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM J. DAVEY & ALAN O. SYKES, JR., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL EcoNomic RELATIONS 830-32 (4th ed. 2002).
43. The ITC is an independent, quasi-judicial federal agency that advises the President and
Congress on matters concerning international trade. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1330-1341 (2007). Among
other things, the ITC investigates the effect of subsidized and dumped imports on domestic indus-
tries. See generally U.S. Intl  Trade Comm'n, About Us, http://www.usite.goviest_relationsiabout_
itc/gen_infoltm (last visited Nov. 2, 2008).
44. See generally JACKSON El AL., supra note 42, at 727-29.
45. Antidumping duties respond to international price discrimination, in contrast with counter-
vailing duties, which respond to government subsidization. J.-G. Castel & C.M. Castle, Deep Eco-
nomic Integration Between Canada and the United States, the Emergence of Strategic Innovation
Policy and the Need for Trade taw Reforin, 7 MINN, J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 1(1998).
46. Blonigen, supra note 40, at 410.
47. The negotiations, collectively called the Uruguay Round, spanned from 1986 to 1994.
JACKSON ET AL., supra note 42, at 218-19. The idea for the reforms to include a new organization
was not formally introduced until May 1990. Id, at 218. The proposal for the WTO and its support-
ing agreements were finalized in Marrakesh, Morocco, in April 1994. Id. at 219.
48. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Apr.
15, 1994,33 1 1 2 5 .
49. See id. at 1145; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Oct. 30, 1947,61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
50. Id art. I ("most favored nation treatment"). Under the GATT, "any advantage, favor, privi-
lege or immunity granted by any [member oldie WTO] to any product originating in or destined for
any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating
in or destined for the territories of all other [WTO members]." Id. art, 1.1.
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protectionism of domestic goods.
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the United States and Canada. agree to abide by the WTO agreements,
52which include, in addition to the GAIT, agreements on countervailing
measures
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member is not abiding by its obligations under these agreements, the
countries resolve the dispute in the WTO's dispute settlement system,
55which is the "central element in providing security and predictability to
the multilateral trading system.'"
56 In contrast, the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA")
is a regional trade agreement between the United States, Canada, and
Mexico.
57 
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duce trade distortions." NAFTA's scope, however, is limited to its three
member nations.
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tween the two regimes!" Disputes are resolved by utilizing one of the
three NAFTA-created dispute resolution mechanisms: Chapter 11, Chap-
ter 19, or Chapter 20.
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51. Id. an. III ("national treatment). Specifically, "[I]he products of the terribly of any [WTO
member] imported into the territory of any other I WTO member) shall be accorded treatment no less
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations
and requirements . . . . "  Id. art. 111.2.
52. World Trade Org., Members and Observers. http://www.wto.orgienglishithewto,y/ wha-
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erned by  the WTO. I A N  F . FERtiussos, Cow) . RESEARCH SERV., THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANI/ATION: BACKGROUNDS AND ISM ,
F S 2 ( 2 0 0 7 ) ,  
a v a i l a b l e  
a t  h t t p : / /
w w w , n a t i o n a l a g
l a w e e n t e r .
rgiassetsters/98-928.pdf.
53. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the Worl d Trade Organization, Annex I  A. Legal  Instruments--Results o f  the
Uruguay Round. 1867 U.N.T.S. 14 'hereinafter SCM Agreement).
54. Agreement on Implementation of  Article VI  of  the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. Apr. 15, 1994. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. Annex IA.
Legal Instruments-- Results of the Uruguay Round. 1868 U.N.T.S. 201 [hereinafter Al)  Agreement].
55. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. Apr. 15.
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. Annex 2, Legal Instru-
ments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 U M ,  1125. 1226 'hereinafter DSUI,
56. Id. an. 32.
57. North American Free Trade Agreement. U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289
[hereinafter NAFTA]. NAFTA is the successor to the agreement between the United States and
Canada. See Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. U.S.-Can., Dec. 22, 1987,1an. 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M.
281 [hereinafter CUSFTA].
58. NAFTA. supra note 57. arts, 101-02.
59_ Id.
60. id. art. 103( I ).
61. Id. art. 103(2).
62. Id arts. 1115 38 (Chapter Eleven; Investment). Id arts. 1901-11 (Chapter Nineteen: Re-
view and Dispute Settlement in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Matters) [hereinafter Chapter
19]; Id arts. 2003-22 (Chapter Twenty: Institutional Arrangements and Dispute Settlement Proce-
dures).
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nism to provide an alternative to judicial review by domestic courts of
final determinations in antidumping and countervailing duty cases, with
review by independent binational panels."
63 Although the WTO agreements and NAFTA control the application
of countervailing duty and antidumping laws, the laws are nonetheless
vulnerable to abuse by investigating authorities," Determining whether
a good has been dumped or subsidized is not a neutral, technical process;
rather, it is a "highly abstruse black art" that skirts the boundary between
what is and what is not allowed according to international obligations.
°Accordingly, once an industry files a complaint, the investigating au-
thorities, subject to internal pressures that can operate to undermine their
work, will strive to make an affirmative finding o f  subsidization or
dumping.
66 To control the potential abuse of countervailing duty and antidump-
ing laws, the WTO rules require an importing country to prove that the
subsidized or dumped goods cause, or threaten to cause, a material injury
to the threatened domestic industry.
° S i m i l a r l y ,  
N A F T A ' s  
C h a p t e r  
1 9
allows the exporting country to challenge countervailing and antidump-
ing duty determinations through binational panels that decide whether
the investigating agencies properly applied their domestic rules and pro-
cedures."
The goal o f  this international oversight is to promote free trade,
whereas the goal of the countervailing duty and antidumping laws, which
elected lawmakers pass and powerful lobbies support, is to protect do-
mestic industries. As  the softwood lumber dispute demonstrates, poli-
tics, as opposed to pure economics, often determine the outcome of con-
tentious, high-stakes trade disputes.
69
B. Lumber I, Lumber II, and the 1986 Memorandum of Understanding
The first dispute between the United States and Canada,''' which
63. Id art. 1904.
M. Han & Dymond, supra note IS, at 20.
65. Id
66. Id
67. Id
68. Id For further discussion of how Chapter 19 panels work, see discussion infra Part II.C.
69. Hart & Dymond, supra note 18, at 20, See Michael Krauss, The Record of the United
Stales-Canada Binational Dispute Resolution Panels, 6 N.Y. INT
.
L L .  R E V .  8 5 .  8 9  
( ( 9 9 3 )  ( " U . S .
legislation gives domestic producers the right to launch costly lawsuits against foreign rivals, with
l ink risk of loss i f the claims of unfair and injurious competition are proved groundless.
- ( q u o t i n gROYAL COMM'N ON THE ECON. UNION & DEN. PROSPECTS FOR CAN., FINAL REPORT 302-03
(1985))).
70. Lumber disputes between the United States and Canada stem back to when the countries
began trading, before Confederation. Grafton et al., supra note 29, at 42. T he dispute grew more
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came to be known as Lumber I, began in 1982 when representatives from
the United States lumber industries filed a countervailing duty petition
with Commerce.
71 T h e  
p e t i t i o
n e r s '  
fi r s
t  
a l l e
g a t i
o n  
w
a
s  
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t  
C a
n a
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' s
provincial governments were subsidizing softwood lumber by selling
rights to cut standing timber ("stumpage")
72 t o  p r i v a t e  
b u y e r s  
a t  
p r i c e s
below what the United States government charged private buyers:
3 T h epetitioners also alleged that imports of this product were materially injur-
ing, or threatening to materially injure, a United States industry:
4 A l -though the ITC determined that there was a reasonable indication that
these imports were materially injuring American industries,
75 C o m m e r c efound that the net subsidy for the Canadian stumpage programs was de
MilliMiS and, therefore, made a negative final countervailing duty deter-
mination:
6 By 1985, Canadian lumber accounted for nearly one-third of  the
United States market, and its market share was growing.
77 I n  1 9 8 6 ,  C o a -lition for Fair Lumber Imports (
-
C o a l i t i o n " ) ,  
a  
c o n s o r t i u
m  
o f  
d i s s a t i s
fi e d
American lumber industry representatives, took advantage of changes in
United States laws
78 a n d  
a g a i n  
fi l e d  
a  
c o u n t
e r v a i l
i n g  
d u
t y  
p e t i
t i o n
.
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Thus began Lumber
heated after World War II when mills started closing and lumber production in the United Stales
started falling. h i  This Comment focuses on the latest dispute over lumber, which has been ongo-
irtg for over a quarter of a century.
71. See Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigations: Certain Softwood Lumber Products
from Canada, 47 Fed. Reg. 49.878-03 (Nov. 3, 19144 The ease was filed by the Coalition for Fair
Canadian Lumber Imports, which was acting on behalf of trade associations and producers in the
United States softwood forest products industries, h i
72. In general. "stumpage refers to standing timber, and "stumpage programs" refer to the
systems by which individuals and companies acquire rights to cut and remove standing timber from
government forests. Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determinations: Certain Softwood Prod-
ucts from Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. 24.159-01. 24,167 (May 31, 1983). Setting the correct price for
stumpage is important: i f  hanesteN pay too much, they harvest fewer and lower quality trees and
may lose their jobs: i f harvesters pay too little, the forests owners do not receive adequate compensa-
tion, and harvesters are vulnerable to accusations of subsidintion. Grafton et al., supra note 29, at
42, 48.
73. Kevin C. Kennedy. .1 Legal Ilistorr af  the Sainvood Lumber Dispute (in a Nutshell). 52
FOREST SO. 43.2. 432 (2006).
74. Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigations: Certain Softwood Lumber Products from
Canada, 47 Fed. Reg. at 49,878.
75. Softwood Lumber from Canada, USITC Pub. No. 1320. Inv, No. 701 -TA-197 (Prelimi-
nary) (Nov. 1982).
76. Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determinations: Certain Softwood Products from
Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. at 24,160 ,61, 24,1(7.
77. Grafton et al., supra note 29, at 42.
78. Lawrence L. Herman„cioliwood Lumber
. T h e  N e v i  
P h a s e .  
B A C K G R O U N D
E R  
( C O .  
H o w e
Inst.. Toronto, Can.), Dec. 6. 2001, at I. available at http://www.cdhowe.org/pdt7Softwood Lumber.
pdf.
79, See Softwood Lumber from Canada. 51 Fed. Reg. 19,422 (May 29, 1986).
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The Coalition alleged that Canada's provincial governments were
charging too little for stumpage rights." In  response, the ITC made a
preliminary determination that Canadian lumber imports injured the
United States lumber industry, and Commerce made a preliminarily de-
termination that the under-pricing of Canadian government timber con-
stituted a fifteen percent subsidy,"
The day Commerce's final countervailing determination was due,
however, the United States and Canada signed a Memorandum of Under-
standingsz ("1986 Memorandum") that settled the dispute," Under the
1986 Memorandum, Canada agreed to impose a fifteen percent tax on its
softwood lumber exports that could be phased out if  the provinces in-
creased stumpage fees." This last-minute resolution began a pattern of
last-minute resolutions for the two countries in the ongoing dispute."
The 1986 Memorandum had its critics. In Canada, many objected
that the fifteen percent tax infringed on Canada's sovereignty over forest
management." The compromise embodied by the 1986 Memorandum
also led to criticism that, following adverse decisions, the United States
could simply change its laws" to reach the legal outcome that the lumber
lobby desired. This perceived inequity fostered hostility in Canada to-
BO. Id  This filing might have intentionally coincided with the negotiation of a free trade
agreement between the United States and Canada. See Carl Grenier, Slate, Provinces, and Cross-
Border International Trade, 26 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 175, 179-80 (2000).
81. Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain Softwood Lumber
Products from Canada, 51 Fed. Reg. 37,453-02 (Oct. 22, 1986). For more information on the differ-
ence between preliminary and final determinations, see 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671b, 1671d (2007).
82. See Determination Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 52 Fed. Reg. 233 (Dec. 30,
1986). Unlike a treaty, which is legally binding upon ratification and requires the consent of the
Senate, a memorandum of understanding "is an instrument concluded between states which they do
not intend to be governed by international law (or any other law) and, consequently, is not legally
binding." ANTHONY ADEL MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 32 (2d ed. 2007). For a more
thorough discussion of "MOUs" and why states use them instead of treaties, sec id. at 32-57,
83. The agreement provided that it was "without prejudice" to the position of either Canada or
the United States as to whether the stumpage programs and practices of Canadian governments
constituted subsidies under United States law or any international agreement. Alan F. Holmer &
Judith Hippies Bello, The U.S.-Canada Lumber Agreement: Past as Prologue, 21 INTI, LAW. 1185,
1197 (1987) (quoting the U.S.-Canada Memorandum of Understanding on Trade in Certain Soft-
wood Lumber Products, I 3(b), Dec. 30, 1986),
84. Id at 1196.
85. See, e.g., Termination of Countervailing Duty Investigation: Certain Softwood Lumber
Products from Canada, 52 Fed. Reg. 315-01 (Jan. 5, 1987) (noting that the petitioner had withdrawn
its countervailing duly petition); Coal. for Fair Lumber Imps. v. United States, No. 94-1627 (D.C.
Cir. filed Sept. 14, 1994) (dismissed by consent of  the parties when a political settlement was
reached in 1996),
86. David N. Wear & Karen J. Lee, U.S. Policy and Canadian Lumber: Effects of the 1986
Memorandum of Understanding, 39 FOREsT So. 799, 800 (1993).
87. See id at 801.
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ward resolving disputes through the United States legal system, which
Canadians condemned as both partial and expensive
C Lumber 111 and the 1996 Softwood Lumber Agreement
Complaints of partiality and expense only grew in Lumber 111, In
1991, after three of  its largest softwood lumber-producing provinces
raised stumpage fees, Canada unilaterally terminated the 1986 Memo-
randum." Reaction in the United States was swift:
91 C o m m e r c e  s e l f -initiated a new countervailing duty investigation
92 a n d  d e t e r m i n e d  
t h a t
Canada was subsidizing its stumpage programs.
93 Hopes were high, however, that the dispute would be resolved
through the newly created dispute resolution provisions in Chapter 19 of
the free trade agreement between Canada and the United States," which
would later be adopted in NAFTA.
95 C h a p t e r  
1 9  
r e m o v e d  
a n t i d u m p
i n g
and countervailing duty appeals from the jurisdiction o f  domestic
courts. 96 Instead, review was vested in a binational panel composed of
five trade experts from the United States and Canada.
97 w i t h  e a c h  
n a t i o n
88. Kennedy. supra note 73, at 434.
89. See. e.g., MICHAEL B. Potcy & CHRISTIAN YODER, THE SOFTWOOD LUMBER DISPUTE
AND CANADA-D.S. TRADE LAW IN NATURAL RESOURCES 181 (1987), quoted in Kennedy. supra
note 73, at 434. Percy and Yoder write: "Mhe quasi-judicial process of resolving trade disputes,
which ostensibly gave Canadian industry their day in court during the investigative phase of the
softwood lumber dispute, should not be assumed to be impartial and immune to political pressures
• [ l ] t  would seem sensible to adopt the ViCW that legal harassment is a long-term cost of doing
business in the United States and that the energies of Canadian industry and government officials
should be devoted to coping with and minimizing, if possible, these long-term costs." Id
90. Charles M. thistle &  Jean-G. Castel, Should the North Amerimn Free Trade Agreement
Dispute Settlement Mechanism in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases Be Reformed in the
Light ofSaftwood Lumber III?, 26 LAW & POLY INT'I. Bus. 823. 847 (1995).
91. See. e.g.. Wear & Lee. supra note 86, at 799 n.1 (stating that a swift response occurred
because Canada's withdrawal came during a period of retrenchment for United States lumber manu-
facturers).
92. Self-Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation: Certain Softwood Lumber Products
from Canada, 56 Fed. Reg. 56,055-03 (Oct. 31, 1991); see cdso Gastle & Castel, supra note 90. at
847-48 (noting that Commerce's initiation dispensed with the requirement of a petition from the
affected United States industry). Commerce also widened the investigation into possible violations
of export restrictions on raw timber from British Columbia. Self-Initiation of Countervailing Duty
Investigation: Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 56 Fed. Reg. at 56,057.
93, Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain Softwood Lumber Products
from Canada, 57 Fed. Reg. 22.570-01, 22.604 (May 28, 1992) (determining 2.91% average counter-
vailing subsidy from stumpage programs); see also Kennedy, supra note 73, at 435.
94, CUSFTA, supra note 57, at 386.
95. NAFTA. supra note 57. at 682; see also Greg Anderson, Can Someone Please Settle This
Dispute? Canadian Solhvood Lumber and the Dispute Settlement Mechanisms of the NAFTA and the
WTO, 29 WORLD Et.'ON. 585, 591 ( 2004
96. See Krauss, supra note 69, at 90.
97. Id (referencing CUSFTA, supra note 57, art. 1904 & Annex 1901,2),
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assured o f  having at least two o f  its citizens serving as panelists.
98 AChapter 19 panel would apply the importing country's countervailing
duty or antidumping laws
99  a n d  
w o u l d  
e m p l o y  
t h e  
s a m
e  
s t a n
d a r d  
o
f  
j u
d i -
cial review as a domestic appellate co u rt .
m These new measures, which were created to ensure impartiality,
however, only exacerbated tensions between the two countries during
Lumber III. Shortly after recourse to Chapter 19 became available, Can-
ada appealed Commerce's determinations
im t o  a  p a n e l  
c o m p o s e d  
o f
three Canadi ns and two Americans.
m2 A f t e r  o n e  
r e m a n d , "
) 3  t h e  
p a n e l
ruled along national lines, with the Canadian majority holding that Com-
merce's determinations were unsupported by United States law. ' "  The
decision marked a turning point, both in the dispute itself and in the lum-
ber industry's hostile perception of Chapter 19.
After Commerce complied with  the panel's instruct ions,
1°5  t h eUnited States further politicized the dispute by bringing an Extraordinary
Challenge to the panel's decision."
)6 T h e  U n i t e d  
S t a t e s  
g o v e r n m e
n t  
c o n -
98. Id.
99. Id. (referencing CUSFTA, supra note 57, art. 1904, 2 ,  which allows reference to "the
relevant statutes, legislative history, regulations. administrative practice and judicial precedents"):
see also NAFTA, supra note 57, art. 1904, 112 ("[T]he antidumping or countervailing duty law con-
sists of  the relevant statutes, legislative history, regulations, administrative practice and judicial
precedents to the extent that a court of the importing Party would rely on such materials in reviewing
a final determination of the competent investigating authority.").
100. Krauss, supra note 69, at 90 (referencing CUSFTA, supra note 57, art. 1904, 11 3 and
citing the Canadian standard as based on the Federal Court Act, R.S.C., ch. F-7, § 28(1) (1985)
(Can.) and the American standard as based on the Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 51 6(A), 46 Stat.
590, 735 (1930)).
101. The two issues in the case were (I) "whether the stumpage programs confer benefits on a
specific group of industries ('specificity')" and (2) "whether the stumpage programs provide timber
to Canadian softwood Lumber producers at preferential rates Cpreferentiality'r Certain Softwood
Lumber Products from Canada (Countervailing Duty), USA-92-1904-0I (May 6, 1993), at 27,
available at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Defau ItS ite/index_e.aspx?Detai II D-440.
102. Patrick Macrory, NAFTA Chapter 19.. A Successful Experiment in International Trade
Dispute Resolution, 168 C.D. HOWE INST. COMMENT. I ,  I I  (2002), available at http://www.world
tradelawmetiartieles/macrorychapter 1 9. pdf
103. For more information on the remand procedure embodied in NAFTA, see discussion infra
Part 11.1).2.
104. Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada (Countervailing Duty), USA-92-1904-
Oi (Dec. 17, 1993), at 7, available at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/index_e.aspx?
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Canada's provincial stumpage programs did not distort the normal competitive markets for softwood
lumber and were not countervailable. Id. In contrast, relying on Daewoo Elecs. Co. v. Int l  Union of
Elec., Technical. Salaried st Mach. Workers, 6 F.3d 1511 (Fed. Cir. 1993), the minority stated that
the majority applied the wrong standard of review and should have shown more deference to Com-
merce's methodology in its determinations. Id. at 95-96.
105. Court Decision and Suspension of  Liquidation on Certain Softwood Lumber Products
from Canada, 59 Fed. Reg. 12,584 (Mar. 17, 1994).
106. Although Chapter 19 decisions are binding and cannot be appealed in domestic courts,
parties can bring an Extraordinary Challenge under NAFTA  to a panel rul ing. Th e  appealing gov-
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tended that the majority had failed to apply the proper standard of review
and that two Canadian panelists had failed to disclose potential conflicts
of interests.
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Extraordinary Challenge Committee affirmed the panel's decision.
109 In his scathing dissent, Judge Malcolm Wilkey, the retired Chief
Judge o f the D.C. Circuit, accused the panel o f substituting its judgment
for what United States law should be, rather than deferring to what Unit-
ed States law was, as required by the Chapter 19 standard o f  review.
11°Echoing the lumber industry's hostility toward Chapter 19, he charged:
[T]his Binational Panel Majority opinion may violate more princi-
ples of appellate review of agency action than any opinion by a re-
viewing body which I have ever read. T h e  United States never
contemplated that United States law would be changed by a bina-
tional body. I f  the substitute appellate system does not achieve sim-
ilar results in applying U.S. law, it may not be long continued.
111Judge Wilkey's dissent reflected the discontent in the United States with
a process that not only allowed unelected foreign nationals to te ll the
United States how to implement its domestic la ws
1 1 2  b u t  a l l o w e d  
C a n a -
dian citizens to command the United States to implement its laws in  a
manner that favored Canadian industry.
113
emment must allege ei ther that a panel member had a serious conflict o f  interest or that the panel
departed from a fundamental rule o f  procedure or exceeded its authori ty  under NAFTA. N A F T A
SECRETARIAT, CANADIAN SECTION, PERFORMANCE REPORT FOR THE PERIOD ENDING MARCH 31,
2001, § 1.2.6 (2001), available at http://www.tbs-sage.cairmaidpr/00-01/NAFTAOODPR/NAFTA
00dpre.pdf.
107. Mark R. Joelson, Resolving Trade Disputes Under the NAFTA: Chapter 19 Binational
Panels Come of  Age, 20 J. INT'T ARB. 121, 127 (2003).
108. Extraordinary Challenge Committee, In re Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Can-
ada, ECC-94-1904-01USA, 51-52 (Opinion o f  Mr. Justice Gordon L.S. Hart), 33 (Opinion o f  The
Honorable Herbert B. Morgan), 93-94 (Dissenting Opinion o f  U.S. Ci rcui t Judge (Ret.) Malcolm
Wilkey) (Aug. 3, 1994), available at http://www.nalta-see-alena.orgiapp/DocRepositoryil /Dispute/
english/FTA_Chapter_19/USA/ue94010e•pdf. Thi s  case remains the only instance in which a panel
under Chapter 19 o f  both CUSFTA and NAFTA has split along national lines. Kennedy, supra note
73, at 435.
109. Extraordinary Challenge Committee, In re Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Can-
ada, ECC-94-1904-01USA, Order Affi rming Binational Panel Decisions 1 (Aug. 3, 1994).
110. Id  at 12-19 (Dissenting Opinion of United States Circuit Judge Malcolm Wilkey).
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disclose thei r potential conflicts o f  interest was a violation o f  the Chapter 19 code o f  conduct for
panelists. Id. at 78-94.
112. See, e.g., Economic Impacts of  the Canadian Softwood Lumber Dispute on U.S. Indus-
tries: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Trade, Tourism, and Economic Del
,
. o f  t h e  S .  C o m m .  
o n
Commerce, Science, and Transp., 109th Cong. 15 (2006), available at http://commereeosenate.govi
public/ fi les/27294.pdf [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (testimony o f  Steve Swanson, Chairman, The
Swanson Group).
13. The bifurcated panel and ECC decisions in Lumber III are unusual. Fo r  example, a 2002
study determined that 86% o f  Chapter 19 decisions were unanimous and, thus, not split along na-
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Lumber III, therefore, had larger implications for United States
trade law than a mere dispute with a neighboring country over building
materials. Firs t, in response to Lumber III, the lumber industry chal-
lenged the constitutionality of  Chapter 19.
114 S e c o n d ,  
w h e n  
C o n g r e s s
enacted th  Uruguay Round Agreements Act, the WTO-implementing
legislation,"
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that were intended to prevent a repeat of  the Lumber III panel deci-
s ion.
116 With these changes in the law threatening to spark another long le-
gal battle and with the United States lumber industry poised to file a new
countervailing duty petition, the United States and Canadian govern-
ments began negotiating a new agreement."
7 I n  1 9 9 6 ,  t h e  
t w o  
c o u n t r i e s
signed the Softwood Lumber Agreement ("SLA 1996) ,
118 a  fi v e - y e a ragreement that prohibited the United States from initiating trade actions
involving softwood lumber in exchange for Canada's commitment to
reduce its lumber exports to the United States.
11° Few disputes arose under the SLA 1996,
120 w h i c h  
c o n t a i n e d  
a n  
a d
hoc dispute resolution mechanism similar to the mechanism created by
Chapter 20 of  NAFTA.
121 T h e  
U n i t e d  
S t a t e s  
o n l
y  
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g h t  
o n
e  
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s e
,
again disputing stumpage charges in British Columbia.
122 P e r h a p s  a s  
a
tionality lines. Leycegui & Cornejo, supra note 10, at 198.
114. Coal. for Fair Lumber Imps. v. United States, No. 94-1627 (D.C. Cir. filed Sept. 14, 1994)
(dismissed by consent of the parties when a political settlement was reached before the court ruled
on the constitutional issues), cited in David A. Gantz, Resolution of Trade Disputes Under NAFTA 's
Chapter 19: The Lessons of Extending the Binational Panel Process to Mexico, 29 LAW & POL'Y
INT1 BUS. 297,315 n.82 (1998).
115. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Rub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3624 (2007)).
116. Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 251, 108 Stat. at 4902.
117. Arguably, increasing profits of United States lumber producers was also a concern. Graf-
ton et al., supra note 29, at 44. By  1995, Canada's market share in the United States had grown to
36%. I d  at 42; see also Ragosta, supra note 26, at 427 (Canada agreed to the SLA 1996 to settle
Lumber III appeals). As  a result of the Chapter 19 decisions, the United States returned over $800
million in tariff revenue to Canada. Grafton, et al., supra note 29, at 42.
118. Softwood Lumber Agreement, U.S.-Can., May 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M• 1195, 1197 (1996)
[hereinafter SLA 1996].
119. Peter Lichtenbaum & Selma Lussenburg, Canadian Law, 31 1NT'L LAW. 477, 479 (1997).
Specifically, Canada limited its export's to 14.7 billion board feet per year. Chi  Carmody, Softwood
Lumber Dispute (2001-2006),100 AM. J. INT1 L. 664, 666 (2006).
120. For example, Pope & Talbot, a United States corporation, brought a challenge against
Canada's implementation of the SLA 1996 because the agreement curtailed the exports of its Cana-
dian subsidiary. For  further discussion, see William S. Dodge, Awards in Pope T al bot ,  Inc. v.
Government of Canada, 23 HASTINGS &  COMP. L. REV. 431 (2000).
121. Chapter 20 panels resolve disputes between NAFTA parties regarding application and
interpretation of the treaty. David A. Gantz, Government-to-Government Dispute Resolution Under
NAFTA 's Chapter 20: A Commentary on the Process, I I  AM. REv. A R B .  481, 488 (2000).
122. Id. at 517.
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reflection that the countries still had some faith in NAFTA's ability to
settle lumber disputes, the Canadian section of the NAFTA Secretariat
acted as secretariat for the proceedings,
I23 a n d  t h e  
U n i t e d  
S t a t e s  
a n d
Canada agreed to suppl ment the SLA 1996's procedural rules with rules
contained within the NAFTA Chapter 20 Model Rules of Procedure.
I24The arbitral panel convened in late 1998, but after a lengthy deliberative
process,125 both countries settled the case the day before the panel was to
issue its opinion.
126
D. Lumber IV
The brief respite from the softwood lumber dispute ended in 2001
as Lumber IV began with the expiration of the SLA 1996.
127 T h e  d a yafter the SLA 1996 expired, the Coalition filed both a countervailing du-
ty petition and an antidumping petition with Commerce.
128 S o o n  a f t e r ,the ITC made a preliminary determination that, although Canadian soft-
wood lumber exports to the United States were not injuring the domestic
industry, the exports were threatening to injure the domestic industry.129
Commerce subsequently made a preliminary determination that Canada
was conferring subsidies of almost 20% on its softwood lumber.
13° These preliminary determinations outraged Canada. Trade Minister
Pierre Pettigrew declared, "It's very frustrating to hear Americans talk
the rhetoric of free trade, but when it comes time to act they support pro-
tectionist voices."
131 I n  
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W. Bush, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien allegedly echoed Pefti-
grew's frustration over the United States' inconsistent views on free
trade: "You want gas; you want oil; and you don't want wood? It 's  too
bad, but if you have free trade, you have free trade."
132 Canada challenged Commerce's preliminary determinations with
the WTO, claiming that the United States had violated its WTO obliga-
tions .
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123. Id. at 518.
124. Id
125. Id
126. Id
127. Carmody, supra note 119, at 666.
128. Anderson, supra note 95, at 600.
129. Carmody, supra note 119, at 666.
130. Id  (subsidy o f  19.31%).
131. See Mark MacKinnon &  Peter Kennedy, Canadians Incensed over Duly on Lumber,
GLOBE & MAIL (Canada), Aug. 11, 2001, at Al ;  see also Monte Mills, Tough Duty.
- U . S . - C a n a d aSoftwood Lumber Rel tions in 2001, 2001 COLO. J. INT'L ENNITL. L. & POL'Y 101, 107-08 (2001).
132. Barry Brown, Lumber Dispute Could Affect State's Imports of  Canadian Gas, BUFFALO
NEWS, Aug. 23, 2001, at E l .
133. Carmody, supra note 119, at 666.
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stumpage programs constituted a "financial contribution" to the lumber
exporters, but Commerce must apply measures based on final determina-
tions rather than preliminary determinations:
34 The following April, Commerce issued its final determination that
Canada was subsidizing softwood lumber:
35 A  m o n t h  
l a t e r ,  
t h e  
I T C  
i s -
sued its final determination that Canadian softwood lumber imports in-
deed pres nted a threat of material injury to the United States lumber
industry.
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a two-track litigation strategy, filing complaints with both the WTO and
the NAFTA Chapter 19 panels:
32 From a legal standpoint, Canada's strategy made sense because the
panels established under the WTO and under NAFTA Chapter 19 apply
different laws :
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Commerce and the ITC complied with the WTO agreement, a multi-
party international treaty that refers to international law for guidance:
39In contrast, the NAFTA Chapter 19 binational panel, which replaces do-
mestic judicial review, evaluates whether the determinations made by
Commerce and the ITC conformed to United States law and applies the
domestic standard of judicial rev iew:
40 P u r s u i n g  
c l a i m s  
u n d e r  
b o t h  
r e -
gimes effectively gave Canada two bites at the apple and, thus, maxi-
mized its chances of obtaining favorable rulings:
4I From a political standpoint, however, the ability of Canada to pur-
sue two-track litigation has been criticized for "encourag[ing] litigious
gamesmanship" and for making the softwood lumber dispute more diffi-
cult to resolve:
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134. Panel Report, United States—Preliminary Determinations with Respect to Certain Soft-
wood Lumber from Canada, 7 . 3 0 ,  7.39, 7.104, WT/DS2361R (Sept. 27, 2002), available at
http://www.worldtradelaw.netireports/wtopanelsfufts-lumbercvds(panel)(full).pdf.
135. Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Certain Softwood Lum-
ber Products from Canada, 67 Fed. Reg. 15,539 (Apr. 2, 2002); Notice of Final Affirmative Coun-
tervailing Duty Determination and Final Negative Critical Circumstances Determination: Certain
Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 67 Fed. Reg. 15,545, 15,546 (Apr. 2, 2002).
136. Softwood Lumber from Canada, 67 Fed. Reg. 36,022 (May 2, 2002).
137. Carmody, supra note 119, at 667.
138. Id. at 672.
139. Id. at 672-73.
140. Castel & Gastle, supra note 45, at 3. Accordingly, a NAFTA binational panel cannot
overturn a determination that is consistent with United States law, even i f the determination is incon-
sistent with WTO obligations. J.R. Johnson, The Effect of the Softwood Lumber Agreement 2006 on
the NAFTA Chapter Nineteen Binational Panel Process, 13 INT'L TRADE LAW & REG. 79, 83 (Nov.
24, 2006), at 4.
141. For example, even i f the Chapter 19 panels ruled that determinations made by Commerce
and the ITC accorded with United States trade law, the WTO panels could rule that the determina-
tions violated the WTO Agreement. Vice versa would also be true.
142. Sydney M. Cone III, Canadian Softwood Lumber and "Free Trade" Under NAFTA, 51
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 841, 850 (2007).
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NAFTA panels regarding Lumber IV were often inconsistent. Addition-
ally, litigating in two forums increased costs to both Canadian and Amer-
ican taxpayers. More importantly, because the suits were simultaneous,
the political tension between the two countries was ongoing and made
settlement negotiations difficult.
Ultimately, neither the WTO's nor NAFTA's dispute settlement
mechanisms satisfied either the United States or Canada: both forums
were excluded in the final settlement of the SLA 2006.
1. The WTO Challenges
Canada brought three challenges before the WTO panels.
143 F i r s t ,in the challenge to Commerce's final countervailing duty determina-
tion,'" the Appellate Body held that, although its analysis was incom-
plete,
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granted by the provincial governments constituted a potential counter-
vailing subsidy.'" Second, in the challenge to Commerce's final anti-
du ping determination, the Appellate Body held that Commerce used an
improper method to calculate dumping levels .
147 F i n a l l y ,  i n  
t h e  c h a l -
lenge to the ITC's final threat-of-injury determination, a panel held that
an "objective and unbiased investigating authority" could not have prop-
erly found a threat of injury based on the reasoning and the evidence
cited by the ITC.'"
143. See Panel Report, United States—Final Countervailing Duly Determination with Respect
to Certain Softwood Lumber _from Canada, 11
1
1j 1 . 1 - 1 . 3 ,  W T /
D S 2 5 7 / R  
( A u g .  
2 9 ,  
2 0 0 3 ) ;  
P a n e l  
R e p o r
t ,
United States—Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from Canada, 1111 1.1-1.3,
WT/DS264/R (Apr. 13, 2004); Panel Report, United States—Investigation of the International Trade
Commission in Softwood Lumber from Canada, 1.1- 1.6,  WT/DS277/R (Mar. 22, 2004). For  the
full text of WTO reports, see http://www.wto.orglenglish/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm.
144. Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Countervailing Duty Determination with
Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, 167,  WT/DS257/AB/R (Jan. 19, 2004).
145. This decision is significant because Commerce already found, and the NAFTA panel
affirmed, that "Canadian provincial timber pricing so distorted the domestic market as to make i t
unusable for subsidy measurement. [Thus,] even i f Canada wins the current dispute, Lumber IV, the
U.S. industry will be well positioned to bring future actions against the unfair pricing." Ragosta,
supra note 26, at 431-32.
146. Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Countervailing Duty Determination with
Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, Till 75, 118, WT/DS257/AB/R (Jan. 19, 2004).
147. Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lum-
berfrom Canada, 117,  WT/DS264/AB/R (Aug. 11, 2004).
148. Panel Report, United States—Investigation of  the International Trade Commission in
Softwood Lumber from Canada, IN 7.89, 8.1, WT/DS277/R (Mar. 22, 2004) (inconsistent with Arti-
cle 3.7 of the AD Agreement and Article 15.7 of the SCM Agreement). On November 16, 2004, to
comply with the WTO report, the ITC issued a new threat-of-injury determination that "elaborated
on, but did not change, its original analysis." Carmody, supra note 119, at 669. Canada challenged
the ITC's determination, which a compliance panel upheld, stressing the need to defer to the domes-
tic investigating bodies. Id.  Canada appealed, and the Appellate Body reversed, holding that the
deferential standard of review applied by the compliance panel was improper. I d  Significantly,
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Three aspects of the WTO component of Lumber IV highlight why
the WTO is not the best forum to settle the softwood lumber dispute.
First, the parties' ability to appeal decisions meant that the settlement
process was long and expensive. Canada first sought consultations with
the United States on May 3, 2002,
149 a n d  t h e  
l a s t  
W T O  
A p p e l l a t
e  
B o d y
decision was not issued until August 15, 2006.
1
" I n  l i g h t  o f  
t h e  
x p e n s e
to t xpayers and the growing animosity fostered by the prolonged litiga-
tion, one of the key selling points of the SLA 2006 was a mechanism that
could quickly and effectively bring some finality to the process.
151 Second, the WTO panel reached a different conclusion than the
NAFTA Chapter 19 panel regarding the ITC's threat-of-injury determi-
nation. Despite this adverse determination, however, the United States
continued to impose duties because a WTO panel, applying WTO rules,
upheld the ITC's threat-of-injury determination.
152 T h i s  
i n c o n s i s t e n c y
undermined the credibility of both panels and provided the United States
lumber industry with evide ce of Canada's unfair trade practices from an
international source.
153 Finally, by changing their methodology, Commerce and the ITC
could continue to impose tariffs and still conform with the WTO deci-
sions, effectively allowing the United States to avoid complying with
adverse decisions.
2. The NAFTA Chapter 19 Challenges
In addition to the three WTO challenges, Canada made three similar
requests for panel review under Chapter 19 of NAFTA.
154 F i r s t ,  i n  t h e
however, the Appellate Body declined to review the ITC's determinations. Id.
149. See Foreign Affairs & Intl  Trade Can., Softwood Lumber, Canada's Legal Actions, WTO
Challenges (2006), http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/eicb/softwood/wto_challenges-en.asp (last visited
Nov. 2, 2008).
150. Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lum-
ber from Canada. Recourse to Article 21.5 of  the DSU by Canada, WT/DS264/AB/RW (Aug. 15,
2006).
151. See Softwood Lumber Products Export Charge Act of 2006, House of Commons Debates
(Hansard), Vol .  141, No. 52, 39th Part., 1st Sess. (Sept. 25, 2006) (Can.) [hereinafter House of
Commons Debates]; see also infra Part II.E.
152. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Many Dimensions of Softwood Lumber, 45 ALTA L. REV. 319,
346 (2007).
153. See, e.g., Press Release, Coal. for Fair Lumber Imps., Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports
Applauds WTO Ruling in Favor of U.S. in Softwood Lumber Dispute Regarding Unfairly Traded
Canadian Lumber (Apr. 3, 2006), available at http://www.fairlumbercoalition.orgidocipress_release
21-3-06.pdf; see also Senate Hearings, supra note 112, at 23 (testimony of Sen. Conrad Bums) ("In
2005, a [WTO] panel report concluded that 'dumped and subsidized imports of softwood lumber
from Canada threatened to materially injure the U.S. industry.' M o n t a n a  families and business
cannot be expected to compete on a market that is subsidized so largely that it drives out legitimate
competition.").
154. See Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada (Department of  Commerce Final
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challenge to Commerce's final countervailing duty determination, the
panel directed Commerce to recalculate its countervailing duty determi-
nations because its calculations were not supported by sufficient evi-
dence.
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determination, the panel instructed Commerce to either eliminate or re-
calculate its antidumping determinations as they applied to various Ca-
nadian lumber companies.
156 T h i r d ,  
i n  t h e  
c h a l l e n
g e  
t o  
t h e  
I T C
' s  
fi n a
l
threat-of-inju y determination—the most controversial of the Chapter 19
triad—the panel directed the ITC, after a series of remands,
157 t o  r e a n a -lyze its injury determination.
158 The antagonism between the ITC and the panel was acute.
159 W h e nthe ITC finally released a determination consistent with the panel's deci-
sion, the ITC protested that the determination was made only because the
ITC "respect[ed] and [was] bound by the NAFTA dispute settlement
process," not because the determination was accurate.
160 D i s s a t i s fi e d ,  t h eUnited State  made an Extraordinary Challeng  of the panel's decision,
which was unanimously dismissed.
161 T h e  U n i t e d  
S t a t e s ,  
n e v e r t h e l e
s s ,
Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Final Negative Critical Circumstances Deter-
mination), USA-CDA-2002-1904-03 (Aug. 13, 2003); Certain Softwood Lumber Products from
Canada (Department of Commerce Final Determination of  Sales at Less Than Fair Value), USA-
CDA-2002-1904-02 (July 17, 2003); Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada (USITC
Final Injury Determination), USA-CDA-2002-1904-07 (Sept. 5, 2003).
155. Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada (Department of  Commerce Final Af-
firmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Final Negative Critical Circumstances Determi-
nation), USA-CDA-2002-1904-03 (Mar. 17, 2006).
156. Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada (Department of Commerce Final De-
termination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value), USA-CDA-2002-1904-02 (June 9, 2005).
157. Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada (USITC Final Injury Determination),
USA-CDA-2002-1904-07 (Sept. 5, 2003); Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada (USITC
Final Injury Determination), USA-CDA-2002-1904-07 (Apr. 19, 2004).
158. Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada (USITC Final Injury Determination),
USA-CDA-2002-1904-07 (Aug. 31, 2004).
159. For example, the panel stated:
[By relying on the same evidence that this Panel has twice found insufficient as a matter
of law to support any finding of a threat of injury, the ITC] has made it abundantly clear
that it is simply unwilling to accept this Panel's review authority under Chapter 19 of
the NAFTA and has consistently ignored the authority of this Panel in an effort to pre-
serve its finding of threat of material injury. This conduct obviates the impartiality of the
agency decision-making process, and severely undermines the entire Chapter 19 panel
review process.
Id. at 3. I n  response, the ITC stated that the panel had "violated U.S law and basic tenets of fair-
ness." Anderson, supra note 95, at 608.
160. News Release, Int' l Trade Comm'n, ITC Files Response to Softwood Lumber Binational
Panel Decision with NAFTA Secretariat (Sept. 10, 2004), available at http://www.usitc.govier/
n12004/er0910bbl.htm. The ITC viewed the Chapter 19 panel as "overstepping its authority, violat-
ing the NAFTA, seriously departing from fundamental rules of  procedure, and committing legal
error." Id
161. Extraordinary Challenge Committee, In r e Certain Softwood Lumber Products from
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Preliminary Determination Aug. 9, 2001 Oct. 30, 2001 May 16, 2001
Final Determination Mar. 22, 2002 Mar. 22, 2002 May 2, 2002
Panel Established Apr. 2, 2002 Apr. 2, 2002 May 22, 2002
Final Report Aug. 13, 2003 July 17, 2003 Sept. 5, 2003
1st Remand Determination Jan. 12, 2004 Oct. IS, 2003 Dec.I 5, 2003
1st Panel Remand Decision June 7, 2004 Mar. 05, 2004 Apr. 19, 2004
2d Remand Determination July 30, 2004 Apr. 21, 2004 June 10, 2004
2d Panel Remand Decision Dec. 1, 2004 June 9, 2005 Aug. 31, 2004
3d Remand Determination Jan. 24, 2005 July 11, 2005 Sept. 10, 2004
3d Remand Decision May 23, 2005 N/A N/A
4th Remand Determination July 7, 2005 N/A N/A
4th Panel Remand Decision Oct. 05, 2005 N/A N/A
5th Remand Determination Nov. 22, 2005 N/A N/A
5th Panel Remand Decision Mar. 17, 2006 N/A N/A
announced that it  would not apply the panel's decision. Thus , even
though Canada won each of the Chapter 19 cases, it could not claim vic-
tory, highlighting Chapter 19's flawed system of remanding decisions to
investigating authorities for implementation.
Chapter 19's remand system is a central reason why it, like the
WTO, is not the best forum to settle the softwood lumber dispute. Be-
cause a Chapter 19 panel cannot enforce its own decisions, it must direct
Commerce and the ITC to make determinations consistent with its find-
ings. Commerce and the ITC, having already investigated and made de-
terminations, are inevitably reluctant to contradict their earlier findings,
particularly i f  the consensus is that a domestic court would have held
differently. A l l  three cases before Chapter 19 panels were characterized
by repeated remands and subsequent decisions, which meant that fruit-
less years passed before the panels issued final decisions and that the
tensions feeding the dispute only worsened.
162
NAFTA Cballenges'
63
Final Outcome
Table 1
Subsidy
Commerce '64
Dumping
Commerce 165
Threat of Injury
ITC 16
'
Oct. 12, 2006
(ECC request ( C a s e  dismissed)
I67 ( E C C  
d e c i s i o n )
withdrawn)
Jan. 5, 2007 A u g .  10, 2005
Canada, ECC-2004-1904-01USA (Aug. 10, 2005), available at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.oreapp/
DocRepository/ I /Dispute/english/NAFTA_Chapter_ I 9/USA/ue20040 1 Oe.pdf.
162. Anderson, supra note 95, at 609.
163. Foreign Affairs & Inel Trade Can., Softwood Lumber, Canada's Legal Actions, NAFTA
Challenges, http://www.dfail-maeci.gc.ca/eicb/softwoodinafta_challenges-en.asp (last visited Nov.
2, 2008); Foreign Affairs &  I n t l  Trade Can., Softwood Lumber, Chronology, Lumber IV,
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/eicb/softwoodichrono-en.asp (last visited Nov. 2, 2008).
164. Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada (Department of  Commerce Final Af-
firmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Final Negative Critical Circumstances Determi-
nation), USA-CDA-2002-1904-03, available at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/index_e.
aspx?DetailID=380.
165. Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada (Department of Commerce Final De-
428 S e a t t l e  University Law Review [ V o l .  32:407
This endless cycle of remands and decisions frustrated both coun-
tries. Canada was frustrated that the United States used the remands to
stall final resolution, profit from countervailing and antidumping duties,
and blackmail the Canadian government into settling the dispute on un-
fair terms.
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investigating authorities were routinely overturned, despite Chapter 19's
deferential standard of review. Furthermore, domestic lobbies were stag-
ing NAFTA rebellions in protest o f  an unelected international body
counter-interpreting the laws that well lobbied, elected officials passed.
The resolution that the Chapter 19 panels provided was that Canada con-
tinued to dump its subsidized lumber into the United States market and
the United States continued to collect duties.
169 T h i s  r e s o l u t i o n  
h u r t  
b o t h
Canadian lumber producers and United States lumber consumers,
1713 a n dit created an impasse that would only be resolved after a lengthy break in
negotiations.
E. The 2006 Softwood Lumber Agreement
After an eighteen-month hiatus, negotiations for a settlement o f
Lumber IV resumed."' Because Canada had emerged the victor in the
NAFTA decisions and was still appealing adverse rulings in the WTO
decisions, opposition to a negotiated settlement was strong in Canada."
2The dispute, however, was taking its toll on the Canadian lumber indus-
termination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value), USA-CDA-2002-1904-02, available at http://www.
nafta-sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/index_e.aspx?DetailID-380.
166. Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada (LISITC Final Injury Determination),
USA-CDA-2002-1904-07, available at  http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/index_e.aspx?
167. hit' l Trade Admin., N. Am. Free Trade Agreement, Article 1904 NAFTA Panel Reviews;
Notice of Panel Decision, 72 Fed. Reg. 1318-03 (Jan. 11, 2007).
168. See House of Commons Debates, supra note 151.
169. Id
170. Id
171. Foreign Affairs &  Int' l  Trade Can., Softwood Lumber, Chronology, http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/eicbisoftwoodichmno-emasp (last visited Nov. 2, 2008); see also Senate Hearings,
supra note 112, at 6 (testimony of Franklin L. Lavin, Under Sec'y, Intl  Trade, Dep't of Commerce).
Negotiations are complicated by the fact that United States negotiators are limited in their ability to
enter into international agreements with sub-national governments, i.e., the Canadian provinces that
own most of Canada's forests. Id. at 7. Purely regional or province-specific solutions are, thus, not
an option. I d
172. See, e.g., House of Commons Debates, supra note 151 (statement by Dominic LeBlanc)
("[The Canadian lumber industries, workers, and communities] will ultimately pay the price for a
bad agreement and for  a global situation that wil l  certainly lead to layoffs and serious trouble for
some companies."); id. (statement by Peter Julian) ("The principle is not only are we selling Out our
softwood industry, but we are selling out any other Canadian industry that wants to use dispute set-
tlement").
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try:' future outcomes of litigation were uncertain;
174 t h e r e  w a s  n o  
g u a r -
antee that the United States would abide by future decisions or would not
simply ch nge its domestic laws to avoid compliance;
175 a n d  fi v e  y e a r sof leg l fees were becoming exp nsive.
176 S i m i l a r l y ,  
t h e  
U n i t e d  
S t a t e s
had an interest in settling: regardless of  how the international panels
eventually ruled, the Lumber IV cases would not resolve the dispute;
177United States lumber mills continued to c lose;
178 a n d  t h e  h o m e -
b u i l d i n g
and construction industries were protesting the high, fluctuating prices of
lumber.
179 The Softwood Lumber Agreement 2006 (SLA 2006) was the com-
promise.
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lion dollars in duties and had refused to apply the NAFTA decisions pre-
scriptively. Under the SLA 2006, the United States agreed to return four
billion dollars in duties to Canada but retained the remaining one billion
dollars.
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to impose duties on lumber imports, and in exchange, Canada agreed to
limit its importation of lumber to one-third of the United States mar-
k et.
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disputes that arise under the agreement in the London Court of Interna-
tional Arbitration ( "LCIA") .
183 T h e  
p a r t i e s  
h o p e d  
t h a t  
t h i s  
l a t e
s t  
g r e
e -
ment would end over twenty years of bickering over softwood lumber.
173. See, e.g., id (statement by Randy Kamp) ("[The parliamentarians] have seen the toll, both
human and financial, that this dispute has taken, and we need to bring an end to this.").
174. See, e.g., id. (statement by James Rajotte) ("The fact is that we had a choice between
further litigation, and even i f we won all of the current legal cases before the courts at present, the
United States could easily alter legislation and start another round of litigation.").
175. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 95, at 590 n.14 (quoting Canadian Prime Minister Paul
Martin: "[The United States is] an extremely litigious society [that seems] to be able to find ways
round what were supposed to be binding settlements.").
176. See, e.g., House of  Commons Debates, supra note 151 (statement by Richard Harris)
("challenge after challenge amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars in increased legal fees").
177. Senate Hearings, supra note 112, at 11 (testimony of Susan Schwab, Deputy U.S. Trade
Rep.) ("[G]iven the long history of this disagreement, there is little reason to believe that the current
round of cases will resolve the matter once and for  all, regardless of  how the process plays out.
Without a negotiated solution, chances are high that the dispute will continue.").
178. Id. at 24 (testimony of Bill Kluting, Legis. Rep., Western Council of  Indus. Workers)
(testifying that after working for thirty-nine years at a Northwest mill, the mill closed, in large meas-
ure, because of the Canadian lumber industry and noting that the average laid-off mill-worker takes
between ten and twelve years to regain his prior rate of pay).
179. Id at 52 (prepared statement of Nat'l Lumber & Bldg. Material Dealers Ass'n).
180. SLA 2006, supra note 6.
181. More specifically, $500 million will be given to the United States lumber companies that
brought the trade complaints; $450 million will be used to fund lumber-promoting initiatives; and
$50 million will be used to establish a binational industry council. 2004-2008 USDA U.S. FOREST
PRODUCTS ANN. MARKET REV. & PROSPECTS, supra note 19, at 8.
182. SLA 2006, supra note 6, arts. V. VII.
183. Id art. XIV(6).
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THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROVISION OF THE SLA 2006:
EVIDENCE OF LESSONS LEARNED IN THE SOFTWOOD LUMBER DISPUTE
The softwood lumber dispute has shown that the United States and
Canada have different, often conflicting opinions about what the dispute
resolution mechanisms should accomplish. For Canada, the mechanisms
should ensure that the United States obeys free trade rules and does not
artificially interfere with Canada's competitive advantage in the lumber
market to protect its own lumber industry.184 For the United States, the
mechanisms should, first, ensure that Canada competes fairly and, sec-
ond, defer to administrative determinations that Canada is dumping sub-
sidized lumber in the United States market at the expense of  United
States lumber producers.
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each side is willing to aggressively defend its position. I n  light of these
entrenched positions, agreeing on a proper dispute settlement mechanism
was a challenge. The compromise that Canada and the United States
reached, however, addressed the lessons the countries had learned from
the dispute in a way that will minimize conflict in future disputes, pro-
vided that an agreement remains in place.
186 The dispute settlement provision in the SLA 2006 creates a two-
step process to settle disputes.'" The first step requires that parties con-
sult with each other before submitting a request for arbitration.
188 T h eimportance of this first step is that it forces the United States and Canada
to strive for a negotiated settlement of their differences.
189 T h e  s e c o n dstep involves submitting the dispute to arbitration. The LCIA has juris-
diction over any disputes that arise under the SLA 2006:
19° L C I A  r u l e sapply ;
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be appealed.
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arbitrator who cannot be a citizen or resident of either party; the two no-
184. See Anderson, supra note 95, at 609.
185. See id.
186. The SLA expires seven years from the date of effective force, with the option of a two
year extension i f the United States and Canada agree. SLA 2006, supra note 6, art. XVIII.
187. Roger Alford, Opinio Juris, Softwood Lumber Goes to LCIA, humllopiniojuris.power
blogs.comipostsichain_1191286269.shtml (last visited Nov. 2, 2008).
188. See SLA 2006, supra note 6, art. XIV(4)-(5). The parties have 20 days to begin consult-
ing and 40 days to resolve the matter after delivery of the request. Id. art. XIV(4), (6).
189. See generally Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
Early Settlement in GATT/WTO Disputes, 24 FORDHAM INV!, L.J. 158 (2000).
190. SLA 2006, supra note 6, art. 14(6).
191.Id
192. Id. art. XIV(13). A l l  hearings are conducted in the U.S. or in Canada, at the tribunal's
discretion. Id.
193. LCIA Arbitration Rules (effective Jan. 1, 1998), available at http://www.lcia.org/ARB_
foldertARB_DOWNLOADSPENGLISH/rules.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2008).
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minated arbitrators then jointly nominate the chair of the tribunal who,
similarly, cannot be a citizen or resident of either party.'" The LCIA
Court must approve, or formally "appoint," each nominee.
195 F u r t h e r -more, parties are not permitted to initiate any litigation or other dispute
settlement proceedings, including proceedings under the WTO or Chap-
ter 20 of NAFTA.
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to each side and keeps the political tensions behind the WTO and
NAFTA out of the dispute itself.
This Part explains four reasons why the dispute resolution mecha-
nism in the SLA 2006 will be more efficient and effective at settling bat-
tles in the softwood lumber dispute than the previous dispute resolution
forums: (a) the expense and schedule, (b) the parties' waiver of appeals,
(c) the governing law, and (d) the identity of the resolving body.
SCHEDULE
197
SLA
2006
198
SLA
1996
199
WTO:
DSI.J
2m
NAFTA:
Ch. 19
20lConsultations begin 20 days 20 days 30 days N/A
Consultations end; request for arbitration 40 days 35 days 60 days N/A
Panel set up; panelists appointed 105 days 70 days 105 days 61 days
Final decision 285 days 135 days 365 days 315 days
A. Expense and Schedule
A faster schedule reduces costs and resolves small disputes before
they gain momentum. Although the schedule stipulated in the SLA 2006
is longer than the schedule stipulated in the SLA 1996, the SLA 2006's
schedule is  significantly shorter than the schedule established by
NAFTA's Chapter 19, particularly when one factors in the possibility of
remands back to the investigating authorities. I t  is also shorter than the
schedule established under the WTO's DSU, particularly when one fac-
tors in the added time for appeals, compliance review, and appeals of
compliance review. A l l  four mechanisms have shorter schedules than
litigation in United States federal courts.
Table 2
194. SLA 2006, supra note 6, art. X1V(7)—(10).
195. id. art. X1V(11).
196. Id art. X1V(2).
197. The count begins with the request for consultation. The figures in Table 2 are approxima-
tions and do not factor in remands, Extraordinary Challenges, appeals, or compliance review.
198. See SLA 2006, supra note 6, art. XIV(4), (6), (9), (10), ( I 1), (19). The SLA 2006 pro-
vides that the reasonable period of time a party has to cure a breach ends Mier 315 days from the
request for consultation. See id art. XIV(22)(a). At  this time, compensatory export measures can be
imposed. I d  art. X1V(22)(b).
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An expedited schedule limits the cost of settling the dispute. The
softwood lumber dispute has been characterized by unresolved, drawn-
out litigation. Every administrative investigation, every panel request,
and every appeal costs taxpayers in both countries millions of dollars,
costs the lumber industries in both countries millions in lost profits and
unquantifiable amounts in lost jobs, and costs the home-building and
construction industries millions from increased lumber prices and de-
creased lumber quality.202 Worst of all, the litigation in previous lumber
disputes was seemingly endless in both time and expense.
203 I t  h a d  b e -come uneconomical to continue, despite potential benefits to domestic
industries, and it had become impractical to continue, despite convictions
on either s ide.
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06 minimizes the risk of interminably wasting money. The schedule is
fixed; it is f st; and it is paid from funds that Canada and the United
States have already allocatee
s An expedited schedule also limits the time during which the dispute
can worsen. F o r  example, during Lumber IV, as NAFTA panels re-
manded their decisions to Commerce and the ITC, the United States con-
tinued to collect tariffs on imported Canadian lumber. In other words, as
the two countries fought over the proper market price of lumber, the con-
sumers in the United States continued to pay artificially inflated prices,
and unlike the lumber companies in Canada, these consumers never had
199. See SLA 1996, supra note 118.
200. DSU, supra note 55, art. 4(3); World Trade Org., Understanding the WTO: Settling Dis-
putes, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/displ_e.hm (last visited Nov. 2, 2008).
The total time for a decision that includes an appeal is one year and three months.
201. NAFTA Secretariat, Overview of the Dispute Settlement Provisions of the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Ideal Timeline for a NAFTA Chapter 19 Panel Review as per
the Rules o f  Procedure, http://www.nalla-sec-alena.org/defaultSite/index_e.aspx?DetailID=8 (last
visited Nov. 2, 2008). Because neither the website nor Chapter 19 provides for the length of  time
consultations might take, the count of days begin with the complaining party's request for arbitra-
tion.
202. I f  harvesters are forced to pay more for stumpage, then they harvest fewer trees. Grafton
et al., supra note 29, at 42.
203. See House of Commons Debates, supra note 151 (statement by Richard Harris) ( If Can-
ada did not agree to the SLA 2006, then "years of uncertainty and years of litigation would be guar-
anteed.... U.S. law is far different from what [Canada] would like to operate under C h a l -
lenges could be changed; every time somebody wanted to speak it could be taken up in the courts,
and another few hundred million dollars in legal fees could be spent.").
204. See i d (statement by Hon. Maxime Bernier, Minister of Industry, CPC) ("[The SLA
2006] eliminates the punitive American duties, puts an end to costly legal proceedings, and gets our
softwood lumber producers out of the courts. Since 2002, this dispute has cost more than $35 mil-
lion in fees that the Government of Canada has paid to help the softwood lumber industry fight this
battle.").
205. SLA 2006, supra note 6, art. XIV(21), provides for a $10 million (U.S.) allotment from
funds already allocated.
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the difference returned to them. Furthermore, continuing to collect the
tariffs put enough economic pressure on Canada to force it to settle the
dispute, rather than litigate the cases it perceived it was winning.206 This
economic pressure increased tensions between the two countries and
overflowed into other areas of international relations.
B. Waiver of Appeals
The LCIA rules provide no option for appealing decisions.
207 T h elack of an opportunity to appeal shortens the time of the dispute, prevent-
ing the underlying situation from worsening and minimizing the expense
of litigation, which grew prohibitively in Lumber IV.
In Lumber IV, the ability to appeal decisions of Commerce and the
ITC, the WTO panels, and even the Extraordinary Challenge of  the
NAFTA panel's ruling on the ITC worsened the conflict. Both countries
continued to appeal adverse rulings while engaging in the very trade
practices that were in dispute. The final settlement of the SLA 2006 was
arguably more a result of battle fatigue than a genuine agreement to re-
solve fundamental differences over pricing in the two lumber industries.
LCIA rules offer a clean reprieve: final decisions of the arbitration
tribunal cannot be appealed. The advantage of not allowing appeals is
that it promotes stability and certainty in both markets, and parties can
rely on the agreement itself to regulate lumber output. The United States
and Canada either will have to abide by the tribunal's decision or will
have to terminate the agreement.
208 Furthermore, the LCIA's prohibition of appeals eliminates the pos-
sibility of escalating political tensions. I n  the softwood lumber dispute,
the appellate process has served to heighten animosity between the two
countries. Canada viewed the United States as utilizing the appellate
process to delay resolution and, at the country's most extreme rhetoric,
206. Compare House of Commons Debates, supra note 151 (statement by David Emerson,
Minister of Intl  Trade, CPC) ("Dumping duties are pernicious in weak markets. Dumping duties
grow. An administrative review indicates that dumping duties will grow this fall. Even i f we con-
tinue to win current litigation, that litigation will be appealed."), with id. (statement by Peter Julian)
("We arc in a situation where it is not a question of seven years of litigation, as the Prime Minister
said so irresponsibly. We were in the final two hurdles, a few board feet short of winning those two
non-appealable victories, and the government has snatched defeat from the jaws of victory, which is
highly irresponsible.").
207. LCIA Arbitration Rules, supra note 193, arts. 26.9, 29.2 (unless otherwise agreed). Under
the DSU, in contrast, the Appellate Body has the power to uphold, modify, or reverse the legal find-
ings and conclusions of the panel. DSU, supra note 55, art. 17(13).
208. The SLA 2006 has a controversial termination clause that allows either party (the United
States or Canada) to terminate the agreement after it is has been in force for eighteen months, pro-
vided that the party provides six month's notice. A l l  trade remedy actions must be postponed for
twelve months following termination. See SLA 2006, supra note 6, art. XX.
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as holding Canadians hostage when the United States lumber industry
faltered. I n  contrast, the United States viewed Canada, first, as utilizing
the appellate process to undermine justified rulings in the United States'
favor and, second, as capitalizing on an international animosity toward
United States' trade practices. Under the SLA 2006, although one coun-
try may be dissatisfied, the arbitration tribunal's decision will be final
and binding.
C. Governing Law
Under the SLA 2006, the place of arbitration is London,
209 w h i c hmeans English law is the lex for i.
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political advantage.
The SLA 2006 tribunal decisions will be more consistent and accu-
rate because the arbitrators only interpret the SLA agreement. I n  con-
trast, for example, the Chapter 19 panels determine whether the anti-
dumping, countervailing duty, and injury determinations were made in
compliance with domestic law!"  Thus, under Chapter 19, a binational
panel has the final decision on whether Commerce or the ITC has fol-
lowed its own laws correctly. The panel must apply the domestic stan-
dard of rev iew
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would apply in reviewing a determination of the investigating author-
ity ! "  As  Lumber III illustrated, however, impartial review is difficult
when the panelists are not experts in appellate review in the country
whose laws are at issue.
214 Unlike the Chapter 19 panels, the tribunal established under the
SLA 2006 does not interpret United States law. The LCIA arbitration
panel is limited to interpreting compliance with the agreement itself, un-
der English legal principles. This difference shields the LCIA from the
criticism of Canadian bias that the United States lumber industry directed
at Chapter 19 panels. Because the SLA 2006 tribunal is solely concerned
with interpreting a trade agreement and does not apply domestic or inter-
national laws, the risk of the LCIA employing the wrong standard of re-
view is less than with Chapter 19 panels.
Furthermore, in contrast with Chapter 19 panel decisions, which
can be subverted by changing domestic law,
215 i f  t h e  L C I A ' s  
d e c i s i o n  
i s
209. Id. art. X1V(13).
210. See Alford, supra note 187. Ler  fal l  means "the law of the forum." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 929 (8th ed. 2004).
211. Chapter 19, supra note 62, art. 1902.
212.M Annex 1911.
213.M art. 1904(3).
214. Anderson, supra note 95, at 593.
215. Decisions against the United States result either in the law being changed, the United
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unfavorable to the United States, the government will have to either
comply or terminate the agreement. Because the agreement is between
the executive branches of Canada and the United States, the substance of
the agreement cannot be changed by a legislature vulnerable to political
pressure.
Finally, the laws governing enforcement of a tribunal established
under the SLA 2006 are tidier than the laws governing enforcement of
NAFTA panel decisions. The New York Convention
216 m a n d a t e s  d o -mestic judicial enforc ment of all final decisions made by the arbitration
tribunal!" Enforcement of Chapter 19 panel decisions is more compli-
cated.
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19 panels interpret United States law, Congress can change laws that lead
to unfavorable outcomes, which only prolongs these types of disputes.
22°Furthermore, panels are ad hoc and do not have to follow precedent, even
though NAFTA explicitly mandates that the standard of review is the
same as applied in the domestic legal system.
22I T h i s  m e a n s  
t h a t  
p a n e l
decisions will differ from n appellate decision in the domestic country.
The LCIA, in contrast, interprets an agreement and not domestic law, and
the LC1A is the only forum to interpret that agreement, therefore making
aberrant decisions are less of a concern.
D. Identity of the Resolving Body
Using the LCIA increases the perceived legitimacy of the dispute
settlement mechanism. The LCIA is a private, not-for-profit company
that has built its reputation on resolving commercial disputes since its
founding in 1892.
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a certain degr e, the mechanisms established under international treaties,
States refusing to comply, or the domestic lumber producers challenging the constitutionality of the
entire process. A  legislature can subvert the decision of a Chapter 19 panel by changing a domestic
law. Although such changes cannot be retrospectively applied to adverse Chapter 19 decisions, they
can ensure that no Chapter 19 decision is dispositive: put more simply, once the laws are changed,
the decisions no longer apply, and the United States can impose new tariffs.
216. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention]. The New York Con-
vention is a treaty ratified by over 135 countries that provides that a decision by an international
arbitral tribunal in a member state will be enforced by the domestic courts of any other member state
as i f the decision were by that domestic court. BARRY E. CARTER, PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE & ALLEN S.
WEINER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 17 (5th ed. 2007).
217. CARTER ET AL., supra note 216, at 17.
218. See discussion supra Part
219. Blonigen, supra note 40, at 422.
220. See Anderson, supra note 95, at 594 n.36.
221. M at 594.
222. LCIA, History of the LCIA, http://wwwicia-arbitration.com (follow "About the LOA"
hyperlink; then follow "History of the LCIA" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 2, 2008).
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LCIA's solvency depends on resolving disputes efficiently and impar-
tially. Furthermore, the LCIA's ability to attract new states to utilize its
services will be predicated, in part, on its ability to solve the disputes that
have arisen under the SLA 2006. T h is  business model, developed
through decades of  successfully interpreting private agreements, may
prove equally successful in interpreting an agreement between two states
that protect the private interests of two industries.
The lumber industries' familiarity with commercial arbitration and
the LCIA's established reputation make the LCIA a more respected and
acceptable forum than an ad hoc panel. Although the current dispute is
between two states, the force that pushes the dispute forward is the lum-
ber industry. The lumber industries in both the United States and Canada
are sophisticated entities familiar with settling disputes through commer-
cial arbitration. The growth of commercial arbitration as a means of set-
tling disputes in the United States means that the domestic critics o f
NAFTA and the WTO within the lumber industry will likely be more
comfortable with the business-friendly model of the LCIA. Therefore,
because leaders within the lumber industry can appreciate the LCIA's
business incentive to ensure a fair outcome to the dispute, arbitration in
the LCIA will be less encumbered than it was under the DSU or under
Chapter 19. In addition, the LCIA has a reputation as one of the premier
organizations at settling commercial disputes. I t  thus lends legitimacy
with name-brand recognition in a way that an ad hoc tribunal does not.
Furthermore, recourse to the LCIA might have the interesting effect
of saving Chapter 19 from its political critics. The softwood lumber dis-
pute has frequently served as a vehicle for challenging Chapter 19 itself.
The Coalition has twice challenged the constitutionality of Chapter 19 in
federal court, first following the disastrous split down national lines in
Lumber 111,
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agreements caused these suits to be dismissed, but following the termina-
tion of SLA 2006, another constitutional challenge is likely. With  the
notable exception of the softwood lumber disputes, however, Chapter 19
has been effective in resolving disputes—its panels have successfully
223. Coal. for Fair Lumber Imps. v. United States, No. 94-1627 (D.C. Cir. filed Sept. 14,1994)
(dismissed by consent of the parties when a political settlement was reached before the court ruled
on the constitutional issues), cited in Gantz, supra note 114, at 315 n.82.
224. Coal. for Fair Lumber Imps. v. United States, 471 F.3d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Central to
the Coalition's claims was that Chapter 19(1) deprived United States industries of their constitution-
ally protected rights of due process and judicial review, Brief of Petitioner at 36-48,62-66, Coal. for
Fair Lumber Imps. v. United States, 471 F.3d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (No. 05-1366); (2) stripped the
President of his authority and responsibility to execute United States trade law, id. at 53-56; and (3)
allowed foreign nationals to instruct federal agencies how to interpret and enforce United States
laws, id. at 48-52.
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resolved over two dozen cases between Mexico, Canada, and the United
States_
225 
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of the United States courts, a broadside challenge to Chapter 19 will re-
main unlikely.
In addition, removing the softwood lumber dispute from Chapter 19
could serve as an impetus for the negotiation of a more effective dispute
resolution system. T h e  softwood lumber dispute is  too politically
charged to combat domestic criticism of Chapter 19. Tension between
the United States and Canada was so taut during Lumber IV that any at-
tempts to fix Chapter 19 would have been futile.
226 R e m o v i n g  t h e  
s o f t -
wood lumber dispute from Chapter 19 will allow the United States and
Canada—as well as Mexico—to negotiate a better mechanism without a
backdrop o f  hostility poisoning negotiations.
227 " F i x i n g "  
C h a p t e r  
1 9
might not be necessary as long as the mechanism is not used to resolve
the softwood lumber dispute.
The exclusion of NAFTA from the SLA 2006 drew speculation that
he Chapter 19 mechanism had outgrown its usefulness. Speculation as
to the demise of Chapter 19 was not new to the softwood lumber dispute:
the SLA 1996 provision for an arbitral body outside of Chapter 19 drew
criticism that the mechanism needed reform. I n  light of Chapter 19's
successes in other areas,
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of the softwood lumber dispute is that it is simply "too big" for Chapter
19.
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dispute, the political differences between the United States and Canada,
and the fundamental differences in the two countries' lumber industries,
no dispute resolution mechanism can be expected to adequately resolve
225. See, e.g., NAFTA Secretariat, NAFTA Chapter 19 Binational Panel Decisions, Reviewing
U.S. Agencies'  Final  Determinations, http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/index_e.aspx?
DetailID-380 (last visited Nov. 10, 2008).
226. As David Emerson, Canada's International Trade Minister, explained: "When we were
under Chapter 19 disputes, the atmosphere was absolutely poisonous. You could barely talk about
any file with the United States because the temperature and the public antagonism was so severe
around the dispute-resolution processes under NAFTA that i t was contaminating the whole relation-
ship." US. Unhappy with Canada on Lumber Deal, ABC MONEY, Aug. 15, 2007, http://www.abc
money.co.ukinews/152007119113.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2008).
227. Emerson has stated that knowing the latest softwood dispute will be settled by binding
arbitration with the LCIA has allowed him to have cordial bilateral sessions at NAFTA meetings
with U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwab. Cordiality was not possible while the dispute was
being litigated before the Chapter 19 panels. Id. Emerson continues: "Now [Canada and the United
States] have disagreements—as we will always have—and we are actually able to carry on in a
workmanlike, professional way." Id.
228. See, e.g., NAFTA Secretariat, NAFTA Chapter 19 Binational Panel Decisions, Reviewing
U.S. Agencies'  Final  Determinations, http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/index_e.aspx?
DetailID=380 (last visited Nov. 10, 2008)
229. See Michael S. Valihora, NAFTA Chapter 19 or the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body: A
Hobson's Choice for Canada?, 30 CASE W. RES. J. INT1 L. 447, 471 (1998).
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the softwood lumber dispute. This  proposition, however, leads to the
following question: Will the softwood lumber dispute be "too big" for
the LCIA?
IV. THE SOFTWOOD LUMBER DISPUTE IN PERSPECTIVE
Like its predecessor dispute resolution mechanisms, the LCIA will
be unable to resolve the softwood lumber dispute. I n  trade disagree-
ments, dispute resolution mechanisms are useful but limiting. Although
panels can sift through a myriad of submissions and counter-submissions
to identify the significant facts and legal issues, the disputes themselves
are limited to technical violations of the underlying agreement. No me-
chanism can completely resolve trade wars like the softwood lumber dis-
pute because the domestic interests of the litigating countries are too en-
trenched and receive too much political support to be resolved apoliti-
cally. Furthermore, even under legally binding agreements like NAFTA
and the WTO, compelling sovereign states to comply with judgments
that conflict with states' perceived interests can be difficult, if  not impos-
sible. Thus, the LCIA will probably be able to resolve disputes involving
softwood lumber without resolving the softwood lumber dispute.
Although the battles may be resolved through LCIA, the war will
not end. The current claims of the United States involve disagreements
over technical interpretations of  the SLA 2006, not fundamental dis-
agreements over forest management or the application of United States
law. Although the dispute and its twenty-five years of warring industries
loom in the background, adverse parties and contentious disputes are not
new to the LCIA. Therefore, as long as there is an agreement in place,
the LCIA should prove an effective means of settling conflicts that fall
under that agreement.
This Part briefly highlights two reasons why the LCIA, although
capable o f  settling conflicts under the SLA 2006, cannot resolve the
softwood lumber dispute: (a) the success of the LCIA is premised on the
existence of a bilateral softwood lumber agreement; and (b) the dispute is
too political to maintain a bilateral softwood lumber agreement.
A. The Necessity of a Softwood Lumber Agreement
The SLA 2006 is a bilateral agreement that will expire after seven
years.230 One advantage of  a bilateral agreement is that it  allows the
American and Canadian executive branches to agree upon a forum to
settle their disputes. Without a softwood lumber agreement, however,
private international arbitration courts, like the LCIA, cannot help re-
230. SLA 2006, supra note 6, art. XVIII.
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solve the softwood lumber dispute. Unless previously agreed, neither the
United States nor Canada is legally required to submit to ad hoc arbitra-
tion at the request of the other country. Without the bilateral agreement,
therefore, these disputes must be resolved under one of the existing legal
systems that have already proved ineffective: NAFTA panels, WTO pan-
els, or the United States legal system.
In the absence of an agreement, even if  the United States and Can-
ada chose to settle disputes with a private international arbitration court,
there is little reason to think that such a court would prove much more
effective than previous courts. For example, part of the attraction of pri-
vate international arbitration courts is their proficiency at interpreting
complicated agreements. Without an agreement, arbitrators would have
to interpret the same domestic and international trade laws that have
stymied WTO and NAFTA panels. They  would encounter the same
problems that the WTO and NAFTA panels encountered. Arbitrators
would not only have to determine the appropriate degree of deference to
give investigating authorities but also provide such deference even where
it conflicted with their understanding of trade law. Furthermore, adding
a private international arbitration institution into the fray of available
forums would increase the chance of conflicting findings between differ-
ent forums.
Moreover, as production prices and market demands fluctuated, the
lumber industries would continue to sue, or lobby their government to
sue, in the venues they calculated would most likely rule in their favor.
Because there would be no bilateral agreement suspending or terminating
all existing litigation, arbitrators' findings and holdings could be contra-
dicted by the findings and holdings of other legal systems litigating the
same issues. Therefore, unless all future American and Canadian ad-
ministrations can negotiate, execute, and obey a continuous softwood
lumber agreement, Lumber V is inevitable.
B. Cyclical Politics
Future American and Canadian administrations will not negotiate,
execute, and obey a continuous softwood lumber agreement because it is
not in their best political interests. The catalysts for a new battle will
inevitably reappear. Past softwood lumber battles routinely began with
the same two political problems: a downturn in the domestic lumber in-
dustry and an increase in Canadian lumber producers' share of the Unit-
ed States market. Considering the breadth of the United States-Canada
trade relationship, however, catering to the concerns of the United States
lumber industry is often not in the best political interests of the Executive
Branch. T he President and trade representatives often must prioritize
440 S e a t t l e  University Law Review [ V o l .  32:407
other concerns ahead of a political softwood lumber solution. For exam-
ple, in the mid-1980s, as President Reagan negotiated the free trade
agreement with Canada, senators from lumber producing states condi-
tioned their approval on restricting Canadian access to United States
lumber markets•
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to "get timber fixed," the United States took negotiations with Canada
over softwood lumber off the table.
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Trade Agreement was too important. I n  the end, Canada and the United
States signe  the free trade agreement; the lumber problem remained
unfixed; and Lumber II began.
233 The history of the softwood lumber dispute is cyclical because the
political pressures that propel the dispute are cyclical. With depressed
local economies and backlashes toward free trade come calls for protec-
tionism.
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able legislation. The Coalition files a complaint with Commerce and the
ITC, both of which determine that Canada is engaging in unfair trade
ractices that threaten to injure American lumber producers. Canada
sues in an international forum that, after a drawn-out process, decides
against the United States. Pressured by powerful lobbies and attempting
to stave off anti-trade pressure, the United States government stalls and
finds way  not to enforce the decision. Members of Congress lobby the
Executive Branch for an advantageous bilateral agreement, to which the
Canadian government capitulates because duties and quotas are taking
too large a toll on its lumber industry. When the provincial antagonism
toward the specifics of the agreement culminates, Canada either with-
draws from or fails to renew the agreement, and the process begins again.
As long as the lumber industries in Canada and the United States
apply political pressure to protect their industries and as long as politi-
cians cave in to that political pressure, the softwood lumber dispute will
continue.
V. CONCLUSION
The LCIA is an efficient and effective forum to settle disputes that
arise under the SLA 2006. The LCIA provides a fast resolution of dis-
agreements over the agreement's implementation, precludes lengthy ap-
231. Daowei Zhang & David Laband, From Senators to the President: Solve the Lumber Prob-
lem or Else, 123 PUB. CHOICE 393,397 (2005).
232. Id.
233. See id
234. Cf Robert K. Rae, The Polities of Cross Border Dispute Resolution, 26 CAN.-U.S. U .  63,
67 (2000) ("It is fair to say that at every juncture [of the 200 years of trading lumber between the
United States and Canada], the issue of protectionism has risen again.").
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peals, and makes decisions free of political bias. The LCIA, therefore,
should prove capable of what it aims to do: solve commercial disputes
that arise under an agreement. Af ter  the agreement expires, however,
Lumber V will need to be litigated.
The softwood lumber dispute will not be solved legally because the
dispute is simply too faceted for available legal regimes to handle. Nor
will the softwood lumber dispute be solved politically: economic down-
turns, hostility toward free trade, and political pressure from two lumber
industries with a twenty-five year grudge are not likely to disappear. The
softwood lumber dispute may, however, be solved economically.
One potential economic solution is consolidation within the indus-
try. As  large Canadian and United States corporations invest heavily in
the lumber industries on both sides of the border, large-scale lobbying
efforts will focus on brokered agreements that maximize profits. Self-
righteousness and bickering over land use is inefficient, particularly to
those more concerned about shareholder profits than about job losses.
Although the desirability of this solution is debatable, it would at least
provide stability to an industry that cannot survive years of litigation.
Another potential economic solution is  harmonizing the United
States and Canadian systems of forest management. To what extent this
is possible is unknown; however, on an abstract level, compatible sys-
tems would prevent one system from being subsidized to the detriment of
the other.
Ultimately, considering the current state of the United States hous-
ing crises and the crisis it is producing in the lumber industries of both
nations, economic considerations may force these two nations to seek a
long-term agreement beyond SLA 2006. A  long-term agreement would
ensure continued recourse to forums such as the LCIA, which is a more
effective means of pacifying battles than previous dispute resolution fo-
rums. Both the WTO and NAFTA dispute mechanisms have proven not
only inefficient and uneconomical in settling the softwood lumber dis-
pute but also more apt at aggravating the conflict than solving it.
A resolution would give Canada and the United States what both
countries want: a healthy trade relationship in softwood lumber and prof-
itable lumber industries. U n t i l  economic conditions allow these two
countries to harmonize their lumber industries and resolve the underlying
dispute, however, the political solution of a bilateral softwood lumber
agreement and the legal solution of a private international arbitration fo-
rum like the LCIA will provide the most effective means for promoting
trade and strengthening domestic lumber production.
